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THE DISSONANCE OF WORK FOR HIRE IN
COMMISSIONED SOUND RECORDINGS: BOULEZ
V. COMMISSIONER REVISITED
I. INTRODUCTION
Though Boulez v. Commissioner' is a twenty-year-old case
concerning events that occurred almost thirty years ago, it is still highly
relevant today. The Boulez court held that a conductor or artist had no
conveyable property interest in a recording when he signed a standard
recording contract, even where the contract stated that he granted rights in
return for royalties based on future sales.2 The court held so on the basis
that Boulez fell under the "works for hire" doctrine and that there were no
express contract terms to the contrary.3 As such, Pierre Boulez had no
copyrightable interest in the recordings and had no interest to convey in
return for royalties.4  Therefore, the so-called royalties were actually
income for personal services and any copyrightable interest in the
recording vested from inception in the commissioning party, the record
company.5 Furthermore, as income for personal services and not royalties,
the earnings were subject to income tax in the United States as well as in
Germany, where Boulez resided.6 This occurred despite the fact that a
treaty between the United States and Germany was in effect to avoid this
particular type of double taxation.7 However, Boulez remains good law
today.'
1. Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584 (1984).
2. See Don Robert Spellman, United States Tax Rules for Nonresident Authors, Artists,
Musicians, and Other Creative Professionals, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 219, 235-36
(1994).
3. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595-96.
4. Id. at 596.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See generally Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal
Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income,
July 22, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., 5 U.S.T. 2768 (creating a treaty that would subject royalty income of
nonresident aliens only to the country of residence) [hereinafter Taxation Treaty].
8. See generally Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-037 (June 20, 1997), available at 1997 WL 337371
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Boulez represents an approach taken by the courts to wrongfully deny
artists any rights in sound recordings that were made after the passage of
the Sound Recording Amendment of 19719 and before 1978, when the
1976 Copyright Act'0 was implemented. Though the cases that Boulez
relied upon for its holding have been largely overturned or have fallen into
disfavor," under Boulez there is still an avenue to deny artists their due
under the copyright laws.' 2 The rights of artists who recorded in the time
period in question are still denied by the Boulez holding. 13  Boulez's
holding still resonates today; a sound recording artist's work for a record
company in the time period in question, absent express contractual terms to
the contrary, is presumed a "work for hire."' 14 Considering the recording
industry's customary practice of not expressly acknowledging an artist's
copyrightable rights in recording contracts, 15 this puts the recording artist
under the presumption of a "work for hire" situation in virtually any
collaboration with a record company. In other words, any artist that made a
sound recording as either an employee of the record company, or as a
commissioned independent contractor of the record company, would have
no copyrightable interest in the recording from the outset.1 6 Therefore, the
artist would not have any property interest in the recording in which to
exchange for royalties-the artist's compensation would be merely for
services rendered. Not only does Boulez deny creative authors their rights
under copyright, it also subjects foreign recording artists to double taxation
(citing IRS rules based on Boulez that sums called "royalties" paid to recording artists for their
services as writers, musicians, vocalists, or producers, with all copyrights retained by the record
company, are "compensation for services rendered"; the ruling advises a record company to
report royalties it pays recording artists as "compensation for services" rather than as "royalties"
on its Form 1099).
9. See Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392
(1971).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
11. See Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966);
Ingrain v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932).
12. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 596.
13. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 172 (N.Y. 2002); Reply
Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 10-11, Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166
(N.Y. 2002) (No. 0763/88); Field Serv. Adv., at 1995 WL 1918495, (IRS FSA Mar. 7, 1995);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-037 (June 20, 1997), available at 1997 WL 337371.
14. See generally Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 172 (noting that an artist had to have reserved a
right in a recording contract to qualify for copyright protection).
15. See generally RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 124
(Billboard Books, 1999) (discussing the unclear and stealthy contractual language the record
industry uses to obtain rights from artists).
16. See generally Boulez, 83 T.C. at 593-94 (holding that Boulez had no property interest in
the recordings he conducted due to a lack of express terms granting him an interest in the
recording, causing his work to fall under the "work for hire" doctrine).
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on "royalties" and denies them the benefits of tax treaties negotiated with
the United States.' 7 Most recently, in 2002, the Boulez holding was cited in
a brief on behalf of a defendant-appellant record company in Greenfield v.
Philles Records.'8 Greenfield concerned recordings made previous to the
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, but still under the 1909 Copyright
Act.' 9 Boulez was cited for several propositions: that an artist under a
standard recording industry contract had no copyrightable interest in the
recording; that, under the "work for hire" doctrine, all copyrightable
interests vested in the commissioning party, namely the record company;
and that the payment of "royalties" to the artist did not denote that the artist
had any copyrightable interest in the recording.20 Although the court itself
did not explicitly cite Boulez,2' the rationale of Boulez prevailed.22
The same rationales were also successfully cited by the defendants-
appellees in Mandrill Music Publishing v. Public Enemy.23  In Mandrill
Music, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's summary judgment for the
defendants-appellees.24 Though most of the opinion dealt with the issue of
the awarding of attorney's fees, the case revolved around a copyright issue
under the same law as Boulez-the use of a recording made in 1973 under
the 1909 Act. .2' The appellees cited Boulez for the proposition that the
17. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-037 (June 20, 1997), available at 1997 WL 337371 (citing IRS
rules based on Boulez that sums called "royalties" paid to recording artists for their services as
writers, musicians, vocalists, or producers, with all copyrights retained by the record company,
are "compensation for services" rendered; the ruling advises a record company to report royalties
it pays recording artists as "compensation for services" rather than as "royalties" on its Form
1099. This approach seemingly applies whether or not the recordings were made before or after
the restriction of the "work for hire" doctrine with implementation of the 1976 Copyright Act.
See id.)
18. See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 10-11, Greenfield v. Philies Records, Inc.,
780 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 2002) (No. 0763/88).
19. See Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 168-69.
20. See Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 10-11, Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc.,
780 N.E.2d 166 (N.Y. 2002) (No. 0763/88).
21. See generally Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 172-73 (citing favorably Ingram v. Bowers, 57
F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932), holding that an artist must have reserved a right in a recording contract to
qualify for copyright protection; also holding that a payment of royalties to the artist did not
restrict the record company's rights in the recording).
22. See generally Boulez, 83 T.C. at 594 (1984) (citing Ingram, 57 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1932) as
consistent with its holding that petitioner Boulez had no copyrightable interest in any recordings
made under his 1969 contract); id. at 591 (holding that the term "royalties" are not dispositive of
a property interest in a recording); id. at 595 (holding that absent express contractual terms to the
contrary, Boulez's work on the recordings were "works made for hire").
23. See Appellees' Brief at 32, 38, Mandrill Music Publ'g v. Public Enemy, 129 F.3d 126
(9thCir. 1997) (No. 96-55376).
24. Mandrill Music Publ'g v. Public Enemy, 129 F.3d 126 (9thCir. 1997).
25. Id.
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plaintiffs recording was made pursuant to a standard recording industry
contract and was, therefore, a "work made for hire. 26 Accordingly, the
plaintiff had no copyrightable interest in the recording.27 Boulez was also
cited by the appellees for the proposition that the plaintiff did not have a
property interest in the recording merely by virtue of receiving
"royalties. 28 As such, the principles of Boulez are very much alive today.
Part II of this Note explores the development of copyright law and
artist's rights, the doctrine of "works made for hire," and the pertinent
international tax law at the time in question. Part III reviews the facts
underlying Boulez. Part IV examines the tax court's analysis of the issue of
whether Boulez had any copyrightable interest in the recordings, and if he
was paid a royalty as per the definition of the tax treaty and the IRS Code.
Part V critiques the tax court's holding, including a detailed analysis of the
precedents relied upon by the court and an examination of the legislative
intent of the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. Part VI examines the
subsequent development of copyright law, including the passage of the
Copyright Act of 1976, and its effect on the "works for hire" doctrine and
the rights of sound recording artists, developments that are not consistent
with the core holdings of Boulez.
This Note argues that the holding in Boulez misapplied its precedents
and ignored the customs and practices of the recording industry in
determining the intention of the parties. Furthermore, this Note contends
that the Boulez court overlooked congressional intent in its misapplication
of the "works made for hire" doctrine. In doing so, the Boulez court
wrongfully denies recording artists their just due under the copyright law in
effect at the time-after the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment and prior
to 1978 implementation of the 1976 Copyright Act. This Note concludes
the Boulez holding should be set aside.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A. The Subject Matter of Copyright Before and After the Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971
Statutory copyright protection for sound recordings in the United
26. See Appellees' Brief at 32, Mandrill Music Publ'g v. Public Enemy, 129 F.3d 126 (9th
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55376).
27. Id. at 38.
28. See id.
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States was first created under the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971.29
Prior to this amendment, sound recordings did not have federal statutory
copyright protection.3° This principle was illustrated by the court's holding
in Capitol Records v. Mercury Records.31 However, the dissent in Capitol
Records noted that even though sound recordings were not included in the
Copyright Act of 1909, they were in fact constitutionally capable of
copyright.
32
In his dissent in Capitol Records, Judge Hand was in agreement with
the majority when he stated, "Congress could grant the performer a
copyright upon [his performance or rendition], provided it was embodied in
a physical form capable of being copied., 33 He went on to comment on the
originality that may be contained in a performance, thereby making it
copyrightable.
[A] musical score in ordinary notation does not determine the
entire performance, certainly not when it is sung or played on a
stringed or wind instrument. Musical notes are composed of a
'fundamental note' with harmonics and overtones which do not
appear on the score. There may indeed be instruments--e.g.
percussive-which do not allow any latitude, though I doubt
even that; but in the vast number of renditions, the performer has
a wide choice, depending upon his gifts, and this makes his
rendition pro tanto quite as original a 'composition' as an
'arrangement' or 'adaptation' of the score itself, which § 1(b)
makes copyrightable.34
The House and Senate Reports on the Sound Recording Amendment
of 1971 ("the Reports") adopted the principle that there is a potential
copyrightable interest in the originality of the artist's performance: "the
House Report suggests that the required originality may emanate from...
the performers whose performance is captured. '35 Copyright protection
29. See Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391
(1971).
30. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955)
(Hand, J., dissenting).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 665.
33. Id. at 664.
34. Id.
35. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
LITERARY, MuSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 2.10 [A][2]
(1978), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. REP. NO.
92-72, at 5 (1971).
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extended beyond protecting the artist. 36 The Reports went on to present the
possibility of a copyrightable interest for the producer of the record: "the
required originality may emanate from.. . 'the record producer responsible
for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound
recording."''37  However, the possibility of a copyrightable interest was
qualified by the fact that a record producer would not be given
"authorship" status for merely "setting up the recording session," if that is
the only basis for the copyright claim.3s Therefore, a producer could have a
claim for authorship only where the producer's actions go beyond that of
merely setting up the recording session.39  Both the House and Senate
Reports specifically refer to the acts of "capturing and electronically
processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final
sound recording." 40 Accordingly, "a separate analysis of the respective
claims to originality by 'performers and record producers is necessary."
'
B. Works for Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of 1909
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, "the word 'author' shall include an
employer in the case of works made for hire. 42 Unfortunately, neither the
term "employer" nor "works made for hire" were defined in the Act; this
role was left to the courts.43 The subsequent decisions dealing with "works
made for hire" under the 1909 Act were inconsistent.44
36. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (stating that a producer may
obtain authorship for recording, mixing and editing the session, and that "usually" there would be
joint-authorship in both the performer and the creative producer in a sound recording).
37. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10 [A][2]; H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72,
at 5.
38. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10 [A][2][b]; see generally H.R REP. NO. 92-487, at 5, S.
REP. No. 92-72, at 5. (stating that a producer may obtain authorship for recording, mixing and
editing the session).
39. See generally Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding under
the 1909 Act that a producer who merely set up and paid for the studio for a recording made in
1975 did not qualify for authorship); H.R REP. No. 92-487, at 5, S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (stating
that a producer may obtain authorship for recording, mixing and editing the session); see also
NIMMER, supra note 37, § 2.10 (A)(2)(b).
40. H.R REP. No. 92-487, at 5, S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5.
41. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10 [A][2].
42. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03 [B][1][a][i].
43. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03 [B][2][ali].
44. Compare Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding that the "works for hire" doctrine applies to independent contractors, absent express or
implied contractual language) with Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936) (holding that there is no presumption of authorship in the
commissioning party and that a commissioning party can obtain authorship only through a
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Initially, the courts defined the work for hire doctrine within the
confines of the standard employer-employee relationship.45 The "works for
hire" doctrine predates the Copyright Act of 1909.46 In Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithography Co.,4 7 a case from 1903, the Court held that the
copyright to advertisements created by an employee during the course of
his employment belonged to his employer.48  This concept was
subsequently incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1909.49 Later courts
were consistent with this principle, holding that works created by
employees in the course of their normal duties were considered works
made for hire and any copyrightable interest vested in their employer.50
The definition of "works for hire" was further developed in
Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.51 The Brattleboro
court held that "work for hire" is presumed to exist "whenever an
employee's work is produced at the instance and expense of his
employer"--the so-called "instance and expense" test. 52 Brattleboro also
extended the "works for hire" doctrine to independent contractors: "[w]e
see no sound reason why these same principles are not applicable when the
parties bear the relationship of employer and independent contractor.,
53
However, the work for hire doctrine merely creates a presumption that
could be overcome "by terms of the contract, express or implicit. 54
Although the Brattleboro application of the "works for hire" doctrine to
independent contractors may constitute the majority approach, 55 there
exists a series of contrary decisions that suggest the presumption that
copyright initially vests in the independent contractor (i.e., the
commissioned party).56 This minority approach is exemplified in Uproar
Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.
57
In Uproar, the court held that the artist/author, Wynn, did not lose his
transfer from the commissioned party).
45. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
46. See Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 567.
47. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
48. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
49. See Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 568.
50. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 46 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd,
142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944).
51. Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 565.
52. Id. at 567.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939).
55. See NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03[B][2][b].
56. See id. at § 5.03[B][2][c]; W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publ'g Co., 27 F.2d 82
(6th Cir. 1928); Uproar Co., 81 F.2d 373; Hartfield v. Herzfeld, 60 F.2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
57. Uproar Co., 81 F.2d at 376.
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copyrightable interest in the work by the mere fact that another party had
commissioned the work.58 Additionally, Wynn's copyrightable interest
could only be divested through an express or implied contractual
assignment based on the intention of the parties.59 In other words, there
was no presumption of a copyrightable interest in the commissioning party,
NBC, and NBC could only obtain a copyrightable interest in the work
through an assignment from Wynn.
Two other cases that stand for the proposition that the artist/author is
not automatically divested of a copyrightable interest merely by the fact
that the work is commissioned are Hartfield v. Herzfield6 and W.H.
Anderson v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co. 61 Both cases set forth the idea
that "[a]n author is not necessarily precluded from copyrighting a work
produced under contract with another person., 62 The W.H. Anderson court
distinguished the rights of an independent contractor by holding that the
copyright presumption in favor of the employer was not applicable in the
context of an independent contractor.63 The W.H. Anderson court further
stated that the commissioned author would not be expected to give up his
copyrightable interest without pay unless there was a transfer of the interest
to the commissioning party by the author for payment.64 These cases
represent an alternative approach to Brattleboro.65 Though Brattleboro is
the majority approach,66 ultimately the intent of the parties is the
dispositive factor in how these cases are decided-not a mechanical
application of one doctrine or another.67
C. Tax Treatment of Nonresident Alien Income
The United States has two different methods to determine tax
58. Id. at 376.
59. See id.
60. Harqfeld, 60 F.2d at 599.
61. W.H. Anderson, 27 F.2d at 82.
62. Id. at 88; see Hartfield, 60 F.2d at 600.
63. W.H. Anderson, 27 F.2d at 88.
64. See id.
65. Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 565.
66. See NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03[B][2][c].
67. See generally Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d
Cir. 1966) (implying that it was the intent of the parties that the advertising belonged to the
advertiser and not the newspaper, noting that the services of the advertising department were an
inducement for the advertiser to solicit in the paper); W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publ'g
Co., 27 F.2d 82, 88 (6th Cir. 1928) (holding that "the intent of the parties as to which of them
shall have the right to copyright is decisive").
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liabilities of nonresidents.68 If the income of a nonresident is connected
with a United States trade or business, then the income is taxed at the same
rate as for United States citizens.69 A nonresident is engaged in a United
States trade or business "if he conducts regular and continuous business
activities in the United States, either directly or through an agent or other
representative."7 ° Also, the income must be "effectively connected" to the
activities of his business or trade in the United States.7 ' If the income is not
"effectively connected" with a United States trade or business, the
nonresident's gross income is taxed at a flat rate of thirty percent.
7 2
Additionally, the tax code treats income as being connected with a United
States trade or business if the income is from a United States source.73
Royalty income is taxed under a different scheme. The taxation of
royalties depends upon the location of the income-generating property.74
Royalty income derived from a property in the United States is generally
taxed under the United States tax scheme.75 If the property generating the
royalty income is outside of the United States, then the income is not
subject to tax in the United States.7 6 However, there is at least one
circumstance where no United States taxes would be assessed on
nonresident royalty income derived from a property in the United States:
under an international tax treaty.77
The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have such a
78treaty. Under the 1954 Convention Between the United States of
America and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, the United States and
Germany agreed that royalty income of nonresident aliens would only be
taxed in the state where the individual resides. 79 This principle is also
reflected in the United States Treasury Department's model income tax
treaty (Model Treaty): "Article 12 of the Model Treaty provides that
royalties may be taxed only by the state in which the individual resides and
broadly defines royalties to include payments for the use of any
68. Spellman, supra note 2, at 224.
69. I.R.C. § 871(b)(1) (2001).
70. Spellman, supra note 2, at 225.
71. I.R.C. § 871(b)(1).
72. Id. § (a)(1).
73. Spellman, supra note 2, at 226.
74. Id. at 231.
75. I.R.C. § 871(d)(1)(A).
76. Id. § (d)(1)(a).
77. Spellman, supra note 2, at 241.
78. See Taxation Treaty at 2770.
79. See id. at 2798.
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copyright... [or] sale of a copyright... [provided] the payments are made
,,80contingent on its productivity, use, or disposition.
The taxation of a nonresident alien's income in the United States
depends on whether the characterization of the income is for royalty or
services. This was the question presented to the Boulez court.82  The
characterization of Boulez's income was, in turn, dependent upon a
copyright issue: did Boulez have a copyrightable interest in the recordings
he made and did that interest vest in him? 83 Boulez's musical interpretation
was clearly within the subject matter of copyright.84 However, there were
two conflicting approaches in determining if his potential copyrightable
interest vested initially in him, or the record company.85 The approach
taken would have serious tax implications for Boulez. If the copyrightable
interest in the recordings initially vested in him, the income could be
characterized as royalty income, and therefore not subject to tax in the
United States.86 Conversely, if the copyrightable interests in the recording
initially vested in the record company, then the income was for services
and subject to tax in the United States.87 The following two sections
examine the facts of Boulez and the court's analysis of his predicament.
III. STATEMENT OF CASE FACTS
Petitioner Pierre Boulez, a French citizen and a nonresident alien of
the United States, is a world-renowned music director and orchestra
conductor.88 In February of 1969, Boulez contracted with CBS Records, a
division of CBS of the United Kingdom and a subsidiary of CBS, Inc., a
United States corporation, to make sound recordings.89 In September 1971,
extensive modifications were made to the 1969 contract. 90 In March of
80. See Spellman, supra note 2, at 243-44.
81. See Part lI.C.
82. Boulez v. Comnm'r, 83 T.C. 584, 590 (1984).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 594.
85. Compare Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 568, with Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co.,
81 F.2d 373, 376 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936) (holding that "work for hire"
did not apply to someone who was not an employee).
86. See Part II.B-C.
87. See id.
88. Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584, 584-85 (1984).
89. Id. at 585; see Contract between CBS Records, a Division of CBS of the United
Kingdom Limited, and Pierre Boulez at 7 (Feb. 19, 1969) (on file with the author).
90. See Contract Amendment between CBS Records, a Division of CBS of the United
Kingdom Limited, and Pierre Boulez (Sept. 13, 1971) (on file with the author); see Boulez 83
T.C. at 585.
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1974, CBS Records exercised its option to renew the 1971 agreement. 91
The 1974 renewal applied to the income generated in 1975. 93
Under the terms of the contract in force in 1974, CBS engaged Boulez
to record phonographs as a conductor with the New York Philharmonic. 95
The contract stated, "we [CBS Records] hereby agree to engage and you
[Boulez] agree to render your services exclusively for us as a producer
and/or performer for the recording of musical and/or literary compositions
for the purpose of making phonograph records. 96 The contract stipulated
that Boulez would make a specific number of recordings for each year of
the contract. 97 The contract further stipulated that Boulez would record
exclusively for CBS, the master would be the property of CBS, and that
Boulez would be paid royalties for the recordings. Specifically, the
contract required
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in paragraph
4. of the Agreement [1969 contract], you will not give or sell
your performances for the purpose of making or assisting in the
making of recordings of any of the compositions or works which
you shall have performed under the Agreement for a period of
ten (10) years from the date of recording of such compositions
but in no event shall such restriction prevent you from making
such recordings after a period of five (5) years after expiration
of the Agreement.98
The contract also stated, "[a]ll master recordings recorded hereunder...
shall be entirely our [CBS Records] property, free from any claims
whatsoever by you."99 Under a complex formula relating to sales of the
recording, Boulez was to be paid royalties for services performed and
rights granted.100 Additionally, this formula stated a percentage of sales to
91.
91. See Boulez 83 T.C. at 585; Contract Extension between CBS Records, a Division of
CBS of the United Kingdom Limited, and Pierre Boulez (Mar. 14, 1974) (on file with the author).
93. See Boulez 83 T.C. at 585.
95. See Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 89 at para. 1.
96. Contract between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 88, at para. 1.
97. See Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 89 at
para. 3.
98. Id. at para. 7.
99. Contract between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 88 at para. 5.
100. Id. at para. 7(a) (stating a complex formula of royalties of generally four to five percent
of the retail sale price); see also Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez,
supra note 89, at para. 6 (changing the royalty payment scheme of the 1969 Agreement for
recordings distributed outside the United States).
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be paid to Boulez, depending upon whether the work being recorded was in
the public domain or not.101
Boulez is a French citizen, but in 1975 he was a resident of Germany
and a nonresident alien of the United States. 0 2 As such he filed a federal
nonresident alien income tax return with the IRS.10 3  On his 1975
nonresident alien tax return, Boulez listed $39,461.47 of royalty income
from his contract with CBS.' °4 Accordingly, he listed it as being exempt
from taxation in the United States.'0 5 Boulez listed this royalty income on
his 1976 German income tax return and paid German taxes on it.'
06
The IRS audited Boulez's 1975 United States income tax return and
held that the "royalty income" of $39,461 did not qualify as royalties under
the tax treaty between the United States and Germany; therefore, this
income was subject to income tax in the United States. 0 7 Boulez invoked
proceedings, as per the treaty, to resolve the dispute. 0 8 Unfortunately, no
resolution was reached, but the IRS did concede that $9,000 of the income
was from sources outside of the United States and therefore not subject to
taxes in the Unites States.' 0 9 This concession still left $30,461 of income at
issue. 10 Accordingly, Boulez brought suit in United States federal tax
court seeking relief." 1
IV. THE BOULEZ COURT'S HOLDINGS
A. Tax Treaty
The court held the tax treaty between Germany and the United States
was controlling." 2  The court used the treaty's definition of royalties,
which are "[r]oyalties and other amounts derived as bona fide consideration
for the right to use copyrights, artistic and scientific works. . . ."' The
101. Contract between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 88, at para. 7(a).
102. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 584-85.
103. Id at 585.
104. Id. at 587-88. 105. Id. at 588.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 588.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 584.
112. Id. at 589..
113. Taxation Treaty, supra note 77, at 2786.
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court also held that the provisions of the treaty took precedence over the
IRS Code." 
4
B. The Court Defines Royalties
The court imparted a twofold analysis regarding royalties. 1 5 First,
the court must ask a factual question: "[d]id petitioner intend and purport to
license or convey to CBS Records, and did the latter agree to pay for, a
property interest in the recordings he was engaged to make, which would
give rise to royalties?"' 16 If so, then the court must address a second legal
question: "did petitioner have a property interest in the recordings which he
was capable of licensing or selling?"'"17
In Boulez, the court held that the first question was "purely factual"
and depended on the parties' intentions. 18 The intent of the parties was to
be determined by examining the record as a whole, including the terms of
the 1974 contract." 19 Ultimately, the court determined that the contract was
unclear.
20
The court noted that the contract consistently referred to the
compensation as "royalties."'' 2  Nevertheless, the court held that affixing
the label "royalty" was not dispositive of Boulez's proprietary interest in
the recordings. 122 The court further noted that the payments were directly
tied to the "proceeds which CBS Records was to receive from sales of
recordings."'123 Once again, the court held that income generated from
future sales was not dispositive of whether Boulez had a proprietary
interest in the recordings.
124
On the other hand, the contract was "replete with language indicating
that what was intended here was a contract for personal services."'' 25 The
court specifically cited contract paragraphs one ("to render your services
exclusively.., as a producer"), three ("to 'perform' in the making of a
certain a number of recordings"), four ("CBS considered petitioner's
114. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 590.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 590-91.
120. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 591.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Kimble Glass Co. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 183, 189 (1947)).
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Karrer v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1957)).
125. See id. at 592.
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services to be the essence of the contract: petitioner agreed not to perform
for others with respect to similar recordings during the term of the
contract"), and thirteen ("CBS Records was entitled to suspend or terminate
its payments" if Boulez failed to perform for a variety of reasons)." 6 The
court especially emphasized paragraph five ("it was agreed that the
recordings, once made, should be entirely the property of CBS"), finding it
significant that "nowhere in the contract is there any language of
conveyance of any alleged property right in the recordings... nor any
language indicating a licensing of any such purported right, other than the
designation of petitioner's remuneration as being 'royalties."",127 The court
held that therefore the contract was for personal services and not for a sale
or licensing of any property rights in the recordings.1
2 8
Since the first prong was met, the court moved to the second prong of
its analysis: the legal question of Boulez's proprietary interest in the
recordings. 129 The court held that for a person to derive income from
royalties, that person must have an ownership interest in the property
generating the royalty income.130 This holding mirrored the approach
followed by the IRS Code of 1959 § 861(a)(4), as well as that of the
previous Code of 1939 § 861(a)(4). 3 '
The court observed that the original contract was from 1969, when
conductors such as Boulez did not have a copyrightable interest in
recordings they participated in making. 32 Boulez argued that the Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971 allowed music directors or performers a
copyrightable interest. 133 However, this "bill does not fix the authorship, or
the resulting ownership, of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the
employment relationship and bargaining among the interests involved."'
34
The court found it critically important that Boulez's contractual
relationship with CBS Records did not change after the amendment, when
he could have had a copyrightable interest, and therefore, a property
interest in the recording.'3 5 This lack of change denoted that Boulez did
not have a property interest in the recordings even after it was possible.
126. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 592.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 593.
130. See id.
131. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(4) (1958); I.R.C. § 861(a)(4) (1940).
132. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 594.
133. Id.
134. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971).
135. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 594-95.
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The court concluded that "the parties saw no need to modify their contract
because they understood that even after the Sound Recording Amendment
of 1971, petitioner still had no licensable or transferable property rights in
the recordings which he made for CBS Records .... ,,136 This conclusion
was further supported by the court's application of the "works for hire"
doctrine.'37
The Boulez court held that the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971
did not change who had a copyrightable property interest under the "works
for hire" doctrine.' 38 A worker, "employed for the specific purpose of
creating a work, including a copyrightable item, the fruits of [the
employee's] labor, carried out in accordance with the employment," creates
a work that is the property of the employer. 39 This creates a rebuttable
presumption that can be overcome by express contractual language.
140
Though Boulez was not considered an employee under the common
law, the court held that he was an independent contractor, analogizing his
relationship to CBS Records to that of "a lawyer, an engineer, or an
architect... to his client, or a doctor to his patient."' 41 The Boulez court
adopted the Brattleboro approach, holding that the "works for hire"
doctrine applied to independent contractors. 42 Therefore, the "works for
hire" doctrine applied to Boulez.143 As an independent contractor under
this doctrine, and absent contractual language to the contrary, Boulez had
no copyrightable interest or conveyable property interest in the recording.
Therefore, Boulez could not derive royalty income from the recordings.'
44
The court found that even after the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971,
the income CBS paid to Boulez did not qualify as royalties under the tax
treaty with Germany and was properly subject to taxation in the United
States.
145
V. ANALYSIS
The Boulez court misapplied the law in its decision of the case. First,
136. Id. at 595.
137. Id. (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 26).
138. See id. at 596.
139. Id. at 595.
140. Id. (citing Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969)).
141. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595.
142. Id.; see also Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68
(2d Cir. 1966).
143. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 596.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the court misapplied Kimble Glass Co. v. Commissioner146 and Karrer v.
United States147 to the facts, disregarding the customs and practices of the
recording industry in determining the intention of the parties. Second,
Boulez ignored congressional intent and misapplied the Brattleboro
conception of the "works made for hire" doctrine to the case. The
congressional intent behind the Sound Recording Amendment is
antithetical to the "instance and expense" test of Brattleboro.'48  The
Boulez court should have followed the Uproar approach, which comports
with congressional intent. Additionally, the Uproar approach is consistent
with the subsequent statutory changes Congress made with respect to
recordings and the "works made for hire" doctrine, namely the 1976
Copyright Act.
A. The Court's Analysis of the Intention of the Parties Did Not Take into
Consideration the Customs and Practices of the Recording Industry
The Boulez court's analysis of the intention of the parties was flawed
for not taking into consideration the customs and practices of the recording
industry. When contracts are deemed ambiguous on their face, trade usage
and the customs and practices of an industry are admissible, and should be
considered. 1
49
Generally, courts first examine the face of a contract as a whole to
determine the intent of the parties.' 50 If a contractual term is ambiguous,
the court will allow extrinsic evidence to clarify the term.' 51 However, the
courts are split on whether extrinsic evidence is allowed to determine that a
term in the contract is ambiguous. 52  Under the stricter "New York"
approach, 153 a contract that is clear and unambiguous on its face must be
146. 9 T.C. 183 (1947)
147. 152 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1957)
148. See supra Part II.A.
149. See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hurst v. W.J. Lake & Co., 31 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Or. 1934) (citing Sawtelle v.
Drew, 122 Mass. 228, 229 (1877)).
150. W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (1992).
151. See generally Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 119 (utilizing customs,
practices and trade usage to interpret an ambiguous term in the contract).
152. Compare W. W. W. Assoc., 566 N.E.2d at 642 (holding that extrinsic evidence is not
allowed in determining an unambiguous term in the contract), with Delta Dynamics, Inc. v.
Arioto, 446 P.2d 785, 787 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
define a term is not whether it is ambiguous, but rather whether it is a meaning to which it is
reasonably susceptible).
153. Compare W. W W. Assoc., 566 N.E.2d at 642 (holding that extrinsic evidence is not
allowed in determining an unambiguous term in the contract), with Delta Dynamics, 446 P.2d at
787 (holding that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to define a term is not whether it is
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enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms. 154 In other words, if a
judge determines that a contract's language is unambiguous, the trier of
fact will need to determine the meaning of the contract terms based on the
face of the agreement and will not be able to consider extrinsic evidence.
155
Conversely, if the judge determines that the language is ambiguous or
unclear, extrinsic evidence will be admissible to determine the meaning of
the contract's terms. 156  Some examples of extrinsic evidence are parol
evidence, customs and practices of the industry, and trade usage.,57 It is
assumed the Boulez court followed the "New York" approach to the
interpretation of ambiguous contractual terms.
The Boulez court held that the intention of the parties in granting
Boulez a royalty was ambiguous: "the contract between the parties is by no
means clear."' 58  On the one hand, the contract contained consistent
references to the income as royalties. 159 The contract stipulated that the
payment was to be based on a percentage of the sales of the recording.
160
On the other hand, Boulez did not seem to be granting or licensing an
explicit property right in exchange for the royalty.' 61 Therefore, extrinsic
evidence was admissible to determine the meaning of the term "royalty."
Boulez relied on the holdings in Kimble and Karrer for the initial part of its
analysis of the parties' intentions with regards to the term "royalty.' 62
1. Kimble Was Misapplied in Boulez
The Boulez court relied on Kimble for the proposition that "the labels
which the parties affix to a transaction are not necessarily determinative of
their true nature.' ' 163  The court was correct in citing Kimble for this
proposition, but it misapplied the principle to the facts of the case at hand.
Kimble is an earlier tax case that involved payments for what was
called a "patent license. ' ' 164 Petitioner Kimble made certain payments to
ambiguous, but rather whether it is a meaning to which it is reasonably susceptible).
154. See W W. W. Assoc., 566 N.E.2d at 642.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 119; Hurst, 31 P.2d at 168.
158. Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584, 591 (1984).
159. Id. at 591.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 592.
162. See id. at 591; see generally Kimble, 9 T.C. 183 ; Karrer, 152 F. Supp. 66.
163. Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584, 591 (1984) (citing Kimble Glass Co. v. Comm'r, 9
T.C. 183 (1947)).
164. Kimble, 9 T.C. at 183.
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three nonresident aliens, who were not engaged in trade or business within
the United States, for an exclusive "license" to use a glass manufacturing
process. 165 As such, the nonresident aliens were subject to withholding tax
in the United States if the income was generated by a license. 166 However,
the nonresident aliens were not subject to withholding tax on the sale of a
patent.167  The IRS contended that the agreements between petitioner
Kimble and the nonresident aliens were licenses to use patents and that all
payments were royalties, which constituted fixed or determinable annual or
periodic income, subject to withholding under section 143(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.168
The issue in Kimble was whether the contract language of an
"exclusive right to make, use and vend" constituted an assignment or
merely a license.' 69 The Kimble court held that "the true nature of the
agreement is not to be determined according to the name by which it is
called.' 7( The Kimble court looked to what the parties actually did-what
they transferred. There, the nonresident aliens transferred the exclusive
rights to make, sell, and vend, thereby transferring all of their rights under
the patent. In doing so, the nonresident aliens sold their patent to Kimble.
Therefore, the court held that the income was for a sale and not royalties
under a license.1
7 1
The Boulez court used this principle of Kimble to hold that the income
generated by Boulez was for personal services. 72 This belies the facts in
the case, especially in light of another type of extrinsic evidence admissible
to explain an ambiguous tenn-the customs and practices of an industry.
First, Boulez's income was analogous to the non-resident aliens'
income in Kimble; he granted an exclusive right to make, sell, and vend
intellectual property to CBS Records in return for payment of royalties.
Though there may be a distinction as Boulez's intellectual property interest
would have been a copyright rather than a patent, Boulez nonetheless
allowed the exclusive use of an intellectual property right-his recorded
interpretation-in return for payment. As noted earlier, under the Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971, Boulez had a copyrightable interest in his
165. See id. at 184-89.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 188-89.
169. Id. at 189.
170. Kimble, 9 T.C. at 189 (citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891)).
171. Kimble, 9 T.C. at 189.
172. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 591.
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interpretation contained in the recordings. 173  This is what CBS was
interested in obtaining exclusive rights over.
Second, Boulez's interpretation of music was an intellectual
commodity as much as the glass manufacturing process was in Kimble.
The average consumer cannot enjoy music by looking at the score.1 74
Despite technological advancements, no mechanical devices can truly
interpret a musical score. It must be played, brought to life by a trained
musician-an interpreter. 175 Buyers of classical recordings generally make
purchases of recordings as much on the basis of who the performers are the
interpreters-as on what the repertoire is. These buyers will often have
multiple versions of the same composition, but by different orchestras,
conductors, and soloists. As a renowned conductor, and therefore
interpreter, of certain composers' orchestral works, Boulez's recorded
interpretations were highly marketable. For example, Boulez's recordings
of Stravinsky are among the most highly regarded interpretations;
therefore, they sell well.176  CBS's motivation behind including the
exclusivity clause of the contract was not to keep Boulez from conducting
the same works with other orchestras. That, in fact, would have been
allowed under the contract.177 CBS's motivation was to have exclusive use
of Boulez's interpretations in sound recordings-a copyrightable
intellectual property-for a fixed period of time. 178  This would have
allowed CBS to monopolize the market for recordings of Boulez's
interpretation of that repertoire for a specific period of time, ten years. 179 In
return, Boulez would receive a percentage of sales as a royalty payment.
Based upon recording industry practices, 180 what Boulez gave CBS was not
173. Id. at 594.
174. See generally Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d
Cir. 1955) (Hand, J., dissenting) (noting that the musical score does not determine the entire
performance).
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., GRAMAPHONE PUBLICATIONS LIMITED, GRAMAPHONE CLASSICAL GOOD
CD GUIDE 960-61 (Kate Bettley ed., 2001) (recommending Boulez's recording of songs by Igor
Stravinsky); ARTHUR COHEN, RECORDED CLASSICAL MUsIC: A CRITICAL GUIDE TO
COMPOSITIONS AND PERFORMANCES 1830 (1981) (recommending Boulez's recordings of
Stravinsky's Four Etudes for Orchestra and describing his performance as "ideal').
177. See generally Contract between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 88, at
para. 4 (stating the contract gave CBS exclusive rights to Boulez's services as a conductor or
producer of sound recordings for a period of five years).
178. See Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 91 at
para. 7.
179. See generally id. at para. 3 (extending CBS's exclusive rights to Boulez's services as a
conductor or producer of sound recordings from a period of five years to ten years).
180. See supra Part V.A. 1.
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his services, but the exclusive use of a copyrightable property interest in his
recorded interpretation. In addition, there was a change of language in the
1971 amendment to Boulez's contract that further bolsters the contention
that Boulez tendered his interpretation of his performance and not merely
his services. The Boulez court mistakenly held that Boulez's original
contract of 1969 remained unchanged after the 1971 amendment; the 1971
amendment to the 1969 agreement was four pages long and contained
approximately three pages of amendments. 18 1  Substituting the word
"performances" for "services" in the amended exclusivity clause was
highly probative when determining the intent of the contract.1
82
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in paragraph
4. of the Agreement [1969 contract], you will not give or sell
your performances for the purposes of making or assisting in the
making of recordings of any of the compositions or works which
you shall have performed under the Agreement... (emphasis
added).'" 3
This is an explicit example that CBS was interested in exclusive
control of Boulez's interpretations-his performances-which are
copyrightable interests.18 4  The language is clear evidence that neither
Boulez nor CBS thought the contract merely included payment for services.
Boulez had an exclusive contract with CBS to record performances of
certain repertoire-a copyrightable interest.185 Boulez could neither "give"
nor "sell" that copyrightable interest to another.8 6 In agreeing to do so,
Boulez assigned all of his copyrightable interests in the recordings to CBS,
similar to how the three nonresident aliens assigned their patent in
Kimble.'
87
2. The Boulez Court Misapplied the Karrer Holding on Royalties
The second part of the Boulez court's analysis of the term "royalty"
misapplied Karrer v. United States.188 Boulez cited Karrer for the
181. See id.; but see Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584, 594 (1984).
182. See Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 89, at
para. 7; cf Contract between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 88, at para. 4.
183. Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 89, at para.
7.
184. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 596.
185. See Contract Amendment between CBS Records and Pierre Boulez, supra note 89, at
para. 7.
186. See id.
187. See Kimble Glass Co. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 183 (1947).
188. See Karrer v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 66 (1957).
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proposition that remuneration based on future sales, was not indicative of a
royalty for the licensing or sale of a property interest, rather than personal
services. 189  This proposition is problematic. First, it was a
mischaracterization of the holding. Furthermore, even if the
characterization was correct, it was not a necessary part of the holding-it
was dictum.
Karrer involved income earned by a Swiss scientist on processes that
he discovered to manufacture vitamins. 190 Professor Karrer, a faculty
member of the University of Zurich in Switzerland, conducted research on
developing a synthetic manufacturing process for vitamin B-2 and vitamin
E.' 9' Karrer collaborated with the Swiss pharmaceutical company F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co. Ltd. of Basle, Switzerland ("Basle"). 192 The
contract between Karrer and Basle constituted a "special employment
contract."' 193 Under Swiss law, this designation allowed Basle to own the
patents that were issued from the collaboration. 94 In return, Basle
promised Karrer a percentage of the sales from the products made using
techniques developed in the course of his research with Basle. 1
95
Patents for both processes were filed in several countries under
Basle's ownership, but not in the United States. 96 The patent process in
the United States requires that a patent be filed by a natural person, namely
the inventor.1 97 Therefore, Karrer, at Basle's expense, filed the patents and
assigned them to Basle as per the terms of their contract.
198
The exclusive rights to exploit these patents were assigned to Basle
and Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., of Nutley, New Jersey, a United States
corporation ("Nutley").' 99 Therefore, Nutley held the right to exploit these
patents,based on Karrer's processes, through Basle. Despite the fact that
Nutley did not have a contract with Karrer, Nutley directly paid Karrer the
percentage Basle owed him for the use of these processes. 200 Additionally,
Nutley listed the payments as royalties and withheld the appropriate
189. ,Boulez, 83 T.C. at 591.
190. See Karrer, 152 F. Supp. at 67-68.
191. See id. at 66-67.
192. Id. at 67.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Karrer, 152 F. Supp. at 67.
196. See id. at 69.
197. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000); see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Edo Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1249
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
198. Karrer, 152 F. Supp. at 69.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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taxes.2°'
Karrer sued claiming that the income was generated for services
rendered to a Swiss company-by a Swiss national and resident under
Swiss law-and therefore, should not have been subject to tax in the United
States. 20 2 The United States argued that the payments from Nutley to
Karrer were subject to federal income tax because they were fixed, periodic
payments to the plaintiff from sources within the United States and fell
within the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 203 Section
211 (a)(1)(A) provides that royalty income from properties located in the
United States is considered sourced in the United States and therefore,
subject to tax in the United States.
204
The court held that Karrer had no property interest in the patents,
having assigned them to Basle. 20 5 Therefore, the income could not be
characterized as a royalty. Additionally, Swiss law supported Karrer's
contention that the income was generated for services performed in
Switzerland under the "special employment contract.' '20 6 Since this point
had not been disputed, the court accepted the designation and held for
Karrer.
20 7
The Boulez court relied on Karrer to support its holding that income
generated on a percentage of future sales is not determinative of whether
such income is from royalties or from services rendered.20 8 This issue was
not central to the holding in Karrer. The holding of Karrer and its
dispositive factors were that (1) Karrer assigned his patents to another party
and therefore had no property interest to derive royalty income from
Nutley, (2) Karrer developed the patents as an employee of Basle as
defined under Swiss law, and (3) no contract existed between Nutley and
Karrer concerning the so-called royalty income.
Boulez is distinguishable from Karrer on the facts. First, Boulez did
have a contract directly with CBS for royalties. Second, he had a
copyrightable interest to convey under the Sound Recording Amendment.
Finally, though there seems to be no express language in the contract with
CBS concerning Boulez's property interest in the recording, a property
interest could be inferred from the contract, especially in light of industry
201. Id.
202. Id. at 70.
203. Id. at 70-71; see I.R.C. § 21 l(a)(1)(A) (1940).
204. I.R.C. § 21 l(a)(1)(A).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 67.
207. Id. at 71-72.
208. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 591.
THE DISSONANCE OF WORK FOR HIRE
customs and practices.
B. The Sound Recording Amendment Presumes That Boulez Had a
Proprietary Interest in the Recording
In holding that Boulez had no property interest in the recording absent
express contractual language, the Boulez court ignored industry custom and
practice. It is virtually unheard of that a record company would explicitly
grant an artist a property interest in a recording. 20 9 However, that does not
mean that an artist lacks a property interest.
The Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 articulates how an artist
and a producer may obtain a copyrightable interest.210 There is a strong
presumption that the artist has a copyrightable interest.211 There is a
weaker argument for the producer obtaining a copyrightable interest.
21 2
The producer must do more than organize the recording session to obtain a
copyrightable interest. 213  The producer must be involved in the actual
artistic endeavor of recording and editing the sound recording by making a
qualitative artistic contribution to the recording process.21 4
Based on these requirements, there is no evidence to suggest that CBS
did more than arrange for Boulez to record with the New York
Philharmonic orchestra. CBS presumably financed the endeavor, created
the artwork and notes for the record jacket, and marketed and distributed
the recording. On the other hand, there is contractual language that
explicitly states that Boulez may have been a producer on the recordings:
"It is understood.., that such engagement by us shall include your services
as a producer and/or performer .... ,,2 15 Even if CBS did have a copyright
claim as a producer, this would not automatically exclude Boulez's interest;
it would merely create co-authorship between Boulez and CBS.2 16  To
divest an artist of the copyrightable interest, the artist must have been an
employee, in the agency sense of the definition, or there must have been a
209. See generally SCHULENBERG, supra note 15, at 124 (discussing the unclear and
stealthy contractual language the record industry will use to obtain rights); see also DONALD S.
PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 365-66 (Simon & Schuster,
1997) (discussing the concept of royalties in classical music).
210. See Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
211. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487 (1971) at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72, at 4-5 (1971).
212. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5.
213. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10 [A][2][b]; see H.R. REP. NO. 92487, at 5; S. REP. NO.
92-72, at 5.
214. See H.R. REP. No. 92487, at 5; S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5.
215. Boulez v. Comn'r, 83 T.C. 584, 585 (1984).
216. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5.
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transfer of interest.
The House Report on the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971
states that "the bill does not fix the authorship, or resulting ownership of
sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the employment relationship
and bargaining among the interests involved."2 17  Nonetheless, with the
strong policy presumption in the bill, it would be seemingly contradictory
to imply that an artist would not have a copyrightable interest merely
because the contract lacks express language. The legislative purpose of the
bill was to make sound recordings copyrightable, give artists a
copyrightable interest, and to prohibit automatic copyrightable interests in
merely business parties absent an agency employee-employer
relationship.1 8 The Boulez court ignored the legislative purpose in its
analysis of the intent of the parties and in its misapplication of the "works
for hire" doctrine to Boulez.
C. The Court Misapplied the "Works for Hire" Doctrine to Boulez
The Boulez court's application of the "works for hire" doctrine was
inappropriate. Boulez relied upon Brattleboro for the proposition that the
"works for hire" doctrine applies to independent contractors. 219 Though
Brattleboro was statutorily superseded by the 1976 Copyright Act, it was
applicable to the copyright issues in Boulez, which occurred in 1975.220
First, the Boulez court misapplied the test from Brattleboro. Second, in
light of the congressional intent in the Sound Recording Amendment of
1971, the court should not have applied the Brattleboro test. Instead, the
approach characterized by Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. was
more applicable to the facts.
2 21
The Boulez court's application of Brattleboro--that the "works for
hire" rule creates a presumption of authorship in favor of the
commissioning party absent express contractual language--does not
217. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5.
218. See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 4-5.
219. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595; see also Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp.,
369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that the "works for hire" doctrine should apply to
independent contractors as well).
220. 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (stating that works for hire only applies in
the context of an employer-employee relationship or where the contract expressly states that the
work is a "work made for hire" in an enumerated category); see also Aldon Accessories v.
Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the 1976 Copyright has nullified the
doctrine of "works for hire" as to independent contractors, other than the nine statutory categories
listed in the Act).
221. Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670
(1936).
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comport with Brattleboro.22  Brattleboro clearly states that the
presumption of authorship would be in favor of the commissioning party,
"unless by the terms of the contract express or implicit, the artist has
reserved a copyright to himself.,
223
Boulez's contract contained language that would imply that a right
was exchanged for payment. First, an exchange of a right for a royalty
would implicitly, if not explicitly, denote that Boulez had a property
interest to convey, and that he granted its use or assigned it in return for
payment. Accordingly, the contract contained the following language: "For
your services rendered hereunder and for the rights granted to us herein we
,,224will pay you the following royalties... . (emphasis added). The
contract thus expressly states that Boulez granted a right to CBS.
Additionally, CBS paid Boulez a royalty in exchange for the granting of
this right. If Boulez had no property interest, it would be logically
inconsistent for him to grant a right to CBS and to receive royalties in
return for the grant. In conjunction with the industry practice not to
expressly state the artist has a property interest in a recording, this language
clearly fulfills the Brattleboro test that there be at least language that
implies that the artist had a property interest in the work.2 2 5 Thus, the
intention of the parties was that Boulez would grant his copyrightable
interest to CBS-his interpretation-in return for a royalty payment, a type
of income exempt from taxation in the United States.226
Second, even absent any express or implied contractual language, the
application of Brattleboro was inappropriate in light of the congressional
intent behind the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971. The main holding
of Brattleboro involved the application of the "instance and expense" test
to independent contractors, absent express or implicit contractual language
to the contrary.227 The "instance and expense" test holds that the "works
for hire" doctrine will be applied where the "employee's work is produced
at the instance and expense of his employer... [i]n such circumstances, the
employer has been presumed to have the copyright., 228 The Brattleboro
222. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595-96.
223. Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 568 (quoting Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939)).
224. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 586.
225. See supra Part V.B.
226. See generally Taxation Treaty (creating a treaty that would subject royalty income of
nonresident aliens only to the country of residence).
227. Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 567-68.
228. See id. at 567; see also Sawyer v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 46 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y.
1942), aff'd, 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that a map created by a government employee
was the property of the United States government as it was produced during the employee's
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court found "no sound reason why these same principles are not applicable
when the parties bear the relationship of employer and independent
contractor., 229 This approach directly conflicts with the legislative intent
that purely business interests in the creation of a recording do not have a
copyrightable interest absent a transfer from the artist.
230
Congress did not intend to grant producers authorship of a recording
where their contributions were merely a business interest (i.e., setting up
recording sessions). 23' This directly conflicts with the rationale behind the
"instance and expense" test, especially when applied to independent
contractors in sound recordings, because the only basis for the test is purely
business and financial interests.232 Congress went further to state that
producers could obtain a copyrightable interest if they contributed to the
artistic elements of the recording, i.e., a qualitative contribution to the
actual recording and engineering of the sound recording.233 Those elements
are not considered at all under the "instance and expense" test. As this test
clearly contradicts the legislative intent of the Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971, it should not be followed. However, there exists a
series of cases that do comport with the congressional intent of the
234amendment. An example of this approach is found in Uproar Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co.
235
Uproar concerned Texaco's engagement of a well-known actor and
comedian, Ed Wynn, to give a series of thirteen weekly radio broadcasts on
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC).236 Wynn's contract stipulated
that he was to be paid $5,000 for each program if he furnished the material,
(i.e., wrote the script) and $3,500 if he did not.237 Wynn's broadcasts were
a success and NBC extended the contract for more than fifty
normal course of duties).
229. Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 568.
230. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971), S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5 (1971).
231. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10 [A][2][b]; see generally H.R. REP. No. 92-487 at 5; S.
REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (stating that a producer may obtain authorship for recording, mixing and
editing the session).
232. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10 [A][2][b]); see generally H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5; S.
REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (stating that a producer may obtain authorship for recording, mixing and
editing the session).
233. See generally H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971) (stating that a producer may obtain
authorship for recording, mixing and editing the session); see also S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (1971).
234. See e.g., Uproar, 81 F.2d 373; W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publ'g Co., 27
F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); Hartfield v. Herzfeld, 60 F.2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
235. 81 F.2d 373.
236. Id. at 375.
237. Id.
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performances. 238 Wynn's jokes and witticisms were a hit with the public,
which inspired him to publish his programs in pamphlet form. Uproar
Company, in conjunction with Wynn, published these programs in a
weekly pamphlet entitled "Uproar., 239 Texaco objected, claiming that they
owned the subject matter of the broadcast and further publication was a
violation of their rights. 240 NBC sued on violations of other rights that are
not pertinent to the analysis of Boulez. 241
The main issue was whether Texaco had "acquired exclusive rights in
the personal script prepared by Wynn... or whether that right remained
with him. ' 24 2 The district court held that, in effect, Wynn was an employee
of Texaco, and as the scripts were prepared in the scope of that
employment, Texaco owned all the scripts.243 Essentially, the District
Court applied the "work for hire" doctrine to an independent contractor.244
The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this application.245
First, the Uproar court held that Wynn was not an employee of
Texaco, and that the "work for hire" doctrine did not apply to him.246
Second, the court held that the scripts belonged to Wynn.247 Finally, the
court held that Wynn did not lose the property interest unless the contract
carried an implied or express assignment, despite the fact that he was paid
an additional $1,500 when he provided the script.248
In other words, in the context of a commissioned relationship, the
author does not automatically lose all property interest in the work. The
copyrightable interest initially vests with the commissioned author. The
author can only be divested of this copyrightable interest through an
assignment, either express or implied.
This principle comports with the congressional intent behind the
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971.249 In congressional reports on the
amendment, Congress stated that a producer could not have an authorship
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Uproar,, 81 F.2d at375.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 376.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Uproar, 81 F.2d at 376.
248. Id.
249. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (omitting sound
recordings from the categories of works in which a commissioned work may be a "work made for
hire.").
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claim absent artistic input in the recording.25° If producers complied with
this requirement, they had co-authorship claims in conjunction with the
artist, not an interest supplanting that of the artist.25 1 In other words, unlike
the "work for hire" doctrine, the artist's copyrightable interest could not be
transferred to the producer by presumption. 2  Instead, artists could
transfer their interests to a producer through an assignment. When the
employment relationship was not an employee-employer relationship in the
agency sense, Congress left the form of the assignment to the existing
contractual relations available-an assignment, either express or implied. 53
This approach is consistent with the language of the Reports.
D. Boulez Is Inconsistent with the Congressional Intent of the Sound
Recording Amendment
The Reports state that "a sound recording will usually, though not
always, involve 'authorship' both on the part of the performers... and on
the part of the record producer" who has made an artistic contribution to
the recording.254 Congress noted that the contribution of the producer
might be "so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable
element in the work., 255 Conversely, Congress also recognized that certain
recordings (e.g., sound effects or sounds of nature) might not vest a
copyrightable interest in a performer, thereby leaving the producer as the
only person with a potential authorship claim. 256  Thus, both the
performer's and the producer's claims of authorship were qualified.257
Congress' intent was to grant authorship to parties that artistically
contributed to the recording. 8  However, Congress presumed that the
250. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5 (1971).
251. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5.
252. We confine our discussions here to the "work for hire" doctrine as applied to
commissioned parties and not employees in the traditional agency sense. Congress presumably
addressed the latter issue in stating "that the bill does not fix the authorship ... but leaves these
matters to the employment relationship." H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-72,
at 5 (1971). The application of "work for hire" in a traditional employee-employer situation was
expressly allowed under the 1909 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1946).
253. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (stating "the bill does
not fix the authorship, or the resulting ownership of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to
the employment relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.").
254. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5.
255. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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"usual" authorship status would be one of joint authorship. 259 Both of these
qualifying factors of authorship-artistic contribution and the usual joint
authorship-fly in the face of the "instance and expense" test in a
commissioned relationship.260
It is impossible for joint authorship to be the usual scenario in a
recording under the Brattleboro "instance and expense" test.261 Generally,
a recording project will involve a featured artist, like Boulez, who is not an
employee, but an independent contractor; 262 therefore, Brattleboro would
apply to most recordings.263 Furthermore, it is not the practice in the
recording industry for the record company to expressly reserve the right of
the artist in a recording.26 Under Brattleboro, these artists are divested of
authorship in their performances. 265 Therefore, the usual-or de facto-
authorship in a recording is solely in the record company. For a performer
to obtain a claim of authorship, he would have to negotiate an express grant
to himself from the record company.266 Not only would this be difficult in
light of industry practices,267 but it also creates a presumption that
copyright authorship is held solely by the record company. 268 This belies
congressional intent that joint authorship in the artist and producer be the
"usual" result in a collaboration between artist and producer in a sound
recording.269  Congress did not qualify this presumption with the
requirement that the artist must obtain his rights in authorship through
270contractual negotiation. 0 Congress did, however, recognize the function
of the marketplace in the determination of authorship and ownership.271
In its application of Brattleboro, the Boulez court ignored the
congressional language dealing with its intent of joint authorship, in favor
259. Id.
260. See Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966).
261. See id.
262. See NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2. 10[A][3]. In Boulez, the New York Philharmonic was
hired by the record company, therefore, the individual musicians, being employees of the
Philharmonic, had no copyrightable interest in the recording under a traditional interpretation of
the "work for hire" doctrine. See Boulez v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 584, 594 (1984).
263. See Brattleboro Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 568.
264. See SCHULENBERG, supra note 15, at 124 (discussing the unclear language used by the
record industry to obtain grants from the artist/producer, and listing the various grant of rights
clauses).
265. See Brattleboro Publ 'g, 369 F.2d at 568.
266. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595.
267. See SCHULENBERG, supra note 15 at 124.
268. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595.
269. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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of the language in the Reports concerning business interests: "'As in the
case of motion pictures, the bill does not fix the authorship, or the resulting
ownership, of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the
employment relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.'
272
The Boulez court found this portion of the legislative history to be a
"significant statement," and used it to rationalize the extension of
Brattleboro to independent contractors in sound recordings.273 Oddly
enough, the court did not analogize Boulez's relationship to CBS to that of
creative artists in the motion picture industry, but instead compared it to
that of a "lawyer, an engineer, or an architect ... to his client, or a doctor to
his patient[,], 274 generally professions not involved with authorship issues.
This begs the question of whether the extension of Brattleboro-i.e., the
"work for hire" doctrine applied to independent contractors-to sound
recordings was justified under the legislative history. There are two
reasons why it was not.
First, the Boulez approach makes the legislative statement concerning
a presumption of joint authorship in the artist and creative producer
superfluous. This runs contrary to the accepted canons of interpretation.275
For example, a court will generally not interpret a term in a contract to
negate other portions of the contract.276 Therefore, a court should not
interpret a statement in legislative history to make other statements
superfluous. Generally, interpreting language requires knowledge of the
context of the statement. 77 The sentence that the Boulez court relied on is
in the same paragraph as the presumption of joint authorship in the artist
and creative producer; in fact, the sentence concerning joint authorship is
the first sentence of the paragraph.278 As previously noted, the recording
industry does not customarily include an express contractual reservation in
the artist.279 In combination with this industry practice, Boulez creates a de
facto, if not a de juris, authorship solely in the record company.280 The
Boulez interpretation of the legislative history makes it impossible to
272. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 594 (citing H.R. No. 92-487, at 5).
273. Boulez, 83 T.C. at 594-96.
274. Id. at 595.
275. See Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supp. Mgmt. Pension Plan, 7 F.3d 1091, 1095
(holding that "[b]y examining the entire contract, we safeguard against adopting an interpretation
that would render any individual provision superfluous.").
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See H.R. NO. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. NO. 92-72, at 5.
279. See SCHULENBERG, supra note 15, at 124.
280. See Boulez, 83 T.C. at 595-96 (1984) (holding that an independent contractor artist
does not have property in a recording absent express language to the contrary).
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reconcile those two statements. Therefore, the interpretation should be
rejected.
Second, this conclusion is further supported by the so-called revision
studies. 28' Beginning in 1955, the Copyright Office, under a congressional
grant, commissioned studies to examine current aspects of the copyright
law.282 Its purpose was to summarize the current law and to prepare for the
revision of the 1909 Act.283  Though not an official indicator of
congressional intent, the studies do give an objective insight into the law as
it existed at the time.284
Though Study No. 13, Works Made for Hire and on Commission (the
"Study"), predates Brattleboro, its general conclusions are not reconcilable
with the broad application of the the "work for hire" doctrine to
commissioned works.285 The Study concluded that case law where
copyright ownership of commissioned works had been vested in the
commissioning party had generally been relegated to situations concerning
portrait photographs and paintings.286 However, the transfers of ownership
in these cases were not accomplished by the application of the "work for
hire" doctrine. Instead, the courts in these cases found either an implied
transfer or that a transfer of copyright passed with the physical object.287
They provided, "[w]here the photographer takes the portrait for the sitter
under employment by the latter, it is the implied agreement that the
property in the portrait is in the sitter, and neither the photographer nor a
stranger has a right to print or make copies without permission from the
sitter., 288 Further, the courts stated, "[w]e believe, therefore... that the
right to copyright should be held to have passed with the painting, unless
the plaintiff can prove that the parties intended it to be reserved to the
artist.
, 289
In other words, copyrights in commissioned portraits were transferred
to the commissioning party through the same type of implied transfer as in
281. See THE COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A., STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT xvii (1963).
282. Id.
283. Id. at xv.
284. Id. at ix.
285. See generally Borge Varmer, Study No. 13 Works Made for Hire and on Commission,
in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 717 (The Copyright Society of the United States of America ed.,
1963) (summarizing current law and legislative proposals up to April of 1958).
286. Id. at 722.
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting from Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113, 118 (D.C. Conn.
1918)).
289. Id. (quoting from Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., Inc., 108. F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.
1939)).
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Uproar, and not through the "work for hire" doctrine. 290 Furthermore, this
approach is mirrored in the several proposed revisions of the 1909 Act.291
Between 1924 and 1940, several bills for the general revision of
copyright law were introduced into Congress. None of the bills envisioned
that copyright in a commissioned work, other than a portrait, would be
deemed to be in the commissioning party: "Except for the foregoing
provisions regarding portraits, the various general revision bills did not
provide affirmative rules regarding the ownership of copyright in
commissioned works. 292 In fact, virtually all of the bills provided a strong
presumption of copyright in the commissioned party: "Instead, most of the
bills contained the negative proviso that the provisions regarding the
authorship or ownership of works made by employees would not apply to
commissioned works in the absence of a contrary agreement. 293 Though
none of these bills were enacted into law, they do provide strong and
consistent evidence of Congress's general attitude towards copyright in
commissioned works: that commissioned parties should generally not be
divested of copyright authorship. This is consistent with the approach
generally adopted in the Copyright Act of 1976.294 Furthermore, it is also
consistent with the subsequent developments in artists' rights in sound
recordings and the application of the "works made for hire" doctrine to
sound recordings.295
VI. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Boulez Holdings Are Inconsistent with the Copyright Act of 1976
Though the Copyright Act of 1976 was not in effect when the events
in Boulez occurred, the Act embodies Congress's intentions in the
290. See id.; Altman, 254 F. at 118; compare Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373
(1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670, (1936). Interestingly, Brattleboro used the same line
of "portrait" cases to extend the "work for hire" doctrine to independent contractors. Brattleboro
Publ'g Co., 369 F.2d at 567-68 . Brattleboro was a case concerning advertising, similar to
Bleistein, the case that developed the "work for hire" doctrine. Id. at 567. These are two
additional factors to weigh in favor of a narrow reading of Brattleboro; that "work for hire"
should not apply indiscriminately to all independent contractors, absent intent to the contrary.
291. See generally Varmer, supra note 282 at 722-727.
292. Id. at 727.
293. Id.
294. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (allowing "work for hire" doctrine in
commissioned works only for nine specific categories).
295. See generally id. (omitting sound recordings from the categories of works in which a
commissioned work may be a "work made for hire").
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development of copyright law and the principles that courts should follow.
The primary holdings of Boulez are not consistent with these principles.
Congress defined commissioned "works made for hire" categorically and
omitted sound recordings from the category.296 The 1976 Act created
categories of commissioned works that could qualify as a "work made for
hire. 29 7 If the commissioned work does not fall into one of the listed
categories, then the work cannot qualify as a "work made for hire;" sound
recordings were not included in those categories. 298  Therefore,
commissioned sound recordings generally cannot qualify as a "work made
for hire" under the 1976 Act; however, there may be a limited exception
under the "compilations" and "collective work" categories.299
Though the Congressional Reports to the 1976 Act do not explain
why sound recordings were not included in the commissioned "work for
hire" categories, 300 the bizarre events that took place surrounding the brief
inclusion, and the subsequent exclusion, of sound recordings in these
categories clarified Congress's rationale. Absent a traditional employer-
employee relationship, Congress did not intend producers to have a claim
for authorship based only on a business contribution.
30 1
Sound recordings were "stealthily" and briefly amended into the
commissioned "work for hire" categories. 0 Within a year, Congress
repealed the amendment in a "flip-flop [that] is unparalleled in the annals
of the Copyright Act., 30 3 In hearings before the House that ultimately led
to the repeal of the amendment, the Register of the Copyright Office,
Marybeth Peters, testified as to the criteria she felt should apply to
authorship claims.3 4  Peters testified that the environment no longer
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03[B][2][a][i].
299. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
300. See generally N1MMER, supra note 35, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii] (stating that it was not clear
whether sound recordings were omitted through inadvertence or deliberately).
301. See generally H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971) (stating that producers can be given
authorship status for recording, mixing and editing the session, but will not be given authorship
status if their contribution is minimal).
302. See generally NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii] (adding sound recordings to
the categories of commissioned "works for hire" even though this amendment was not included in
any previous drafts of the bill, and was not the subject matter of the bill).
303. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 5.03[B][2][a][ii]; see Work Made for Hire and Copyright
Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-379, §2(a)(1)(2), 114 Stat. 1444 (2000).
304. United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary
House of Representatives, 106th Cong. 41 (2000) (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register,
Copyright Office of the United States, Library of Congress).
2005]
468 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:435
existed in which record companies could claim that artists were employees
and that the "work made for hire" doctrine applied.0 5 Instead, she
proposed a new scheme to determine authorship, which would take into
consideration the interests and contributions of the record companies, the
artists, the producers, and the modem environment in which sound
recordings were made and sold.306 The proposal was that the Copyright
Office would assign authorship to "key contributors," defined as those who
have made a major contribution of copyrightable expression to a sound
recording.30 7  Included in this category were featured artists and
producers.0 8
Peters specifically mentioned the contribution that producers make to
a recording, stating that in some circumstances the producer's contribution
could equal or even exceed those of the featured recording artist.
30 9
Though the language of the repeal does not explicitly mention Peters'
statements, her statements echo and elaborate on the language used in the
Reports to the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971-that the only viable
claims for authorship are from the artist, and the producer's claim for
authorship occurs when the producer makes a significant artistic/expressive
contribution to the sound recording, not merely a business contribution.31
VII. FINALE: BoULEz SHOULD BE REJECTED
Boulez was improperly decided. Its holding, that an artist under a
standard recording agreement had no property interest, and that the
Brattleboro "works for hire" doctrine applied to commissioned sound
recordings, was derived from a faulty analysis. There was sufficient
language to at least imply a property interest in Boulez. The holdings also
contradict the congressional intent behind the Sound Recording
Amendment that the "work for hire" doctrine does not apply to artists who
are independent contractors, and absent an assignment, Congress presumed
that artists and producers who contributed to the expressive qualities on the
sound recording would be co-authors. 31 Furthermore, Boulez is contrary to
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5; S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5; see generally NIMMER, supra
note 35, § 2. 10[A][2][b] (stating that a producer would not have a claim to authorship if the only
basis was "setting up the recording").
311. See H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 5 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-72, at 5 (1971); see generally
NIMMER, supra note 35, § 2.10[A][2][b] (stating that a producer would not have a claim to
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the developments in copyright law that are embodied in the Copyright Act
of 1976.'12 Additionally, there is an alternative approach313 that not only
comports with congressional intent, but is also consistent with the parties'
intent, which is the touchstone of the analysis.31 4
Boulez's interpretation of the music was a copyrightable interest in
the sound recordings he made for CBS. He transferred these interests for a
payment of royalties. Therefore, according to the tax treaty, these royalties
were subject to tax only in Germany.315 This is the just and fair outcome of
this case. The aberrant holdings of Boulez should no longer be used to
deny sound recording artists their just due under the copyright law. Boulez
should be overturned and rejected by future courts.
Charles Coker*
authorship if the only basis was "setting up the recording").
312. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
313. See W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publ'g Co., 27 F.2d 82, 91 (6th Cir. 1928);
Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670
(1936); Hartfield v. Herzfeld, 60 F.2d 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
314. See generally Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d
Cir. 1966) (implying that it was the intent of the parties that the advertising belonged to the
advertiser and not the newspaper, and noting that the services of the advertising department was
an inducement for the advertiser to solicit in the paper).
315. See generally Taxation Treaty, supra note 77, 5 U.S.T. 2768 (creating a treaty that
would subject royalty income of non-resident aliens only to the country of residence).
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